eEXTREME

Newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group
on Extremism & Democracy

Newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy

e-Extreme Managing Editors

Audrey Gagnon, *University of Ottawa*
Lazaros Karavasilis, *University of Bremen*
Sabine Volk, *University of Tübingen*

Book Review Liaison

Ghita Bordieri, *University of Milano-Bicocca*

E&D Steering Committee

Léonie de Jonge, *University of Tübingen*
Daphne Halikiopoulou, *University of York*
Annika Werner, *University of Southampton*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STANDING GROUP ANNOUNCEMENTS

Dear *e-Extreme* readers,

We hope this issue finds you in good health and high spirits, wherever you may be. Inside, you will find our usual mix of announcements, reports, book reviews, expert interviews, and alerts to keep you informed about the latest developments in the field of extremism and democracy.

This issue features a short report on the inaugural stand-alone conference of the Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* held outside of the ECPR General Conference. We are also pleased to present two book reviews: **Ghita Bordieri** discusses Kathleen M. Blee, Robert Futrell and Pete Simi's *Out of Hiding: Extremist White Supremacy and How It Can be Stopped*, while **Luca Carbone** reviews Mario Dunkel and Melanie Schiller's edited volume, *Popular Music and the Rise of Populism in Europe*.

Moreover, e-Extreme features a section of expert interviews highlighting recent developments on the extremes of the political spectrum. In this issue, **Mariana S. Mendes** discusses the outcomes of the Portuguese legislative elections on 18 May 2025, with a particular attention to the performance of the far-right party Chega. **Henry Rammelt** follows with a discussion about the Romanian presidential elections in May 2025, focusing on the rise of the far-right AUR.

Please get in touch with your contributions and ideas for the next issue and don't forget that the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* has a Bluesky account (@ecpr-ead.bsky.social) where you can follow us for the latest news and updates, calls for papers, and must-read publications.

Wishing you all the best for a successful and inspiring Fall semester!

E&D STANDALONE CONFERENCE 2027

In June, we partnered with Queen Mary University of London to host the first-ever **E&D standalone conference**. Following this successful event, we are now looking for a new team of hosts to organise the **second edition in 2027**. If you and your institution are interested in hosting, please get in touch by **1 November 2025 at the latest**.

E&D BEST PAPER PRIZE

We are pleased to announce that this year's Best Paper Prize was awarded to Dominika Tronina for her paper: "Networked Similarity: Co-creating Visibility for Anti-Gender Ideology through Transnational Discourse Coalitions on Twitter/X." In a scholarly landscape increasingly attuned to the complex interplay between digital technologies and political mobilization, Tronina's work makes a very welcome and valuable contribution. Her innovative application of the concept of networked similarity sheds vital light on how anti-gender movements coalesce across borders—not through centralized coordination, but through a shared digital language of hashtags and symbolic alignment. Her study combines methodological sophistication, drawing on over 300,000 tweets across five European countries, with deep theoretical insight. It powerfully demonstrates how social media platforms are not just arenas of communication, but infrastructures where ideological alliances are forged and amplified. This paper was recognised by all jury members for its conceptual clarity, methodological strength, and topical relevance. It introduces the idea of networked similarity to explain how anti-gender actors build transnational connections online—particularly through shared hashtags—without formal coordination. We warmly congratulate her on this well-deserved recognition.

We would like to thank members of the jury – Kai Arzheimer (University of Mainz), Caterina Froio (Sciences Po Paris), and Sofia Ammassari (Griffith University) – as well as the Chair of the Jury, Léonie de Jonge, for their time and thoughtful evaluation of the submissions.

BEST PAPER PRIZE 2025

We are pleased to continue the **E&D Best Paper Prize** to recognize outstanding contributions by early career researchers (PhD students and scholars within five years post-PhD, with possible extensions for career interruptions). Eligible papers must have been presented at the **2025 General Conference in Thessaloniki** as part of an E&D SG panel and must not have been published at the time of submission. Papers will be judged based on originality, rigour, and significance. If you are eligible and wish to be considered, please submit your paper to the Steering Committee **within one week after the conference**. The recipient will be announced at the **ECPR General Conference 2026**.

THE E&D STEERING COMMITTEE IS EXPANDING – JOIN US!

To keep up with our growing activities, we are expanding the **E&D Steering Committee**. We are particularly looking for colleagues interested in **social media outreach** and **event planning**. There are **three open spots**. If you're interested in joining, please nominate yourself by sending a short paragraph to ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com, introducing yourself, your connection to the E&D group, and your motivation for joining. The deadline for nominations is **30 September 2025**. If more than three people apply, we will organise formal elections via the ECPR system. If you have questions, feel free to reach out in person in Thessaloniki or via email.

JOINT SESSIONS 2026

The call for workshop proposals for the **ECPR Joint Sessions 2026** (7–10 April at the University of Innsbruck) is now open: https://ecpr.eu/JointSessions. The deadline is **30 September 2025**. Each Standing Group or Research Network may endorse only one workshop proposal, and such endorsements are given preferential treatment by the ECPR. If you have a proposal that you think may be of interest to the Extremism & Democracy Standing Group, please send it to ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com by **20 September 2025**.

REGISTER AS AN E&D STANDING GROUP MEMBER

You can join the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* always free of charge and at the click of a button, via the ECPR website (https://ecpr.eu/Groups). If you have not already done so, please register as a member so that our list is up to date and complete.

In order to join, you will need a MyECPR account, which we assume many of you will already have. If you do not have one, you can create an account in only a few minutes (and you need not be from an ECPR member institution to do so). If you are from a non-member institution, we will need to accept your application to join, so your membership status (which you can see via your MyECPR account, and on the Standing Group pages when you are logged in to MyECPR) will be 'pending' until you are accepted. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch!

CALL FOR REVIEWERS

e-Extreme is offering scholars the opportunity to review books and articles! If you want to share your review of the latest published books or articles in the field of populism, extremism, and radicalism and have it published in *e-Extreme*, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us via: ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com.

E&D ROUTLEDGE BOOK SERIES

The Routledge Book Series in *Extremism and Democracy*, which publishes work that lies within the Standing Group's academic scope, covers academic studies within the broad fields of 'extremism' and 'democracy', with volumes focusing on adjacent concepts such as populism, radicalism, and ideological/religious fundamentalism. These topics have been considered largely in isolation by scholars interested in the study of political parties, elections, social movements, activism, and radicalisation in democratic settings. Since its establishment in 1999, the series has encompassed both influential contributions to the discipline and informative accounts for public debate. Works will seek to problematise the role of extremism, broadly defined, within an ever-globalising world, and/or the way social and political actors can respond to these challenges without undermining democratic credentials.

The series was originally founded by Roger Eatwell (University of Bath) and Cas Mudde (University of Georgia) in 1999. The editorial team now comprises Andrea L. P. Pirro (Scuola Normale Superiore) and Léonie de Jonge (University of Tübingen). The editors strongly encourage ideas or suggestions for new volumes in the book series, both from established academics and early career researchers. To discuss any ideas or suggestions for new volumes in this book series, please contact the editors directly.

KEEP US INFORMED

Please keep us informed of any upcoming conferences or workshops you are organising, and of any publication or funding opportunities that would be of interest to Standing Group members. We will post all details on our website. Similarly, if you would like to write a report on a conference or workshop that you have organised and have this included in our newsletter, please do let us know.

Please, also tell us of any recent publications of interest to Standing Group members so that we may include them in the 'publications alert' section of our newsletter, and please get in touch if you would like to see a particular book (including your own) reviewed in *e-Extreme*, or if you would like to review a specific book yourself. We are always keen on receiving reviews from junior and senior scholars alike!

Finally, if you would like to get involved in the production of the newsletter, the development of our website, or any of the other activities of the Standing Group, please do get in touch. We are always very keen to involve more and more members in the running of the Standing Group!

UPCOMING EVENTS AND CALLS

THE WEBINAR SERIES ON 'RESEARCHING THE FAR RIGHT: METHODS AND ETHICS' IS BACK!

The Webinar series on *Researching the Far Right: Methods and Ethics* is back for another academic year to discuss the methodological, ethical, political, personal, practical and professional issues and challenges that arise when researching far-right politics. For this new edition, the *Center for Research on Extremism* (C-REX - University of Oslo) has the great privilege of collaborating with the *Canadian Network for Research on Security, Extremism and Society* (CANSES) to discuss researching the far right in a safe and ethical way. Make sure to join us on zoom on the third Thursday of each month from 5-6 pm (CET)!

SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE HUB ON EMOTIONS, POPULISM AND POLARISATION (HEPP6)

The Sixth Helsinki Conference on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation (HEPP6) will be held 18-20 May 2026 at the University of Helsinki and online. The call for papers and panel proposals is open until 31 October 2025.

Since 2019, the HEPP conferences have provided a space to explore themes related to populist mobilisation, polarisation, and the dynamics of emotional engagement in various political and mediatised contexts. In addition to this thematic core, the HEPP6 conference will include a special focus on the emotional dynamics of grievance politics and their impact on democracy.

We invite submissions that explore a diverse range of themes, reflecting our ongoing work and recently completed projects, well beyond PLEDGE. We are excited about methodological innovations that, for example, combine discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis with computational methods, including those that make use of LLMs and AI. This includes our EP election study, which gathered an extensive dataset of short campaign videos from across the political spectrum during the 2024 European Parliament elections, capturing not only the data but also the experiences of our researchers. Additionally, we encourage participants to draw inspiration from HEPPsters' individual project topics, such as discursive constructions of war in political rhetoric and imaginaries of sexuality and gender in culture politics and activism.

We welcome contributions from political science, media studies, social psychology, history, anthropology, sociology, memory studies, gender studies, urban studies, and other related fields. Traditionally, HEPP conferences have featured discussions on semi-peripheral regions such as the Global South and East Central Europe, and we hope to continue that this year. We also invite papers addressing ongoing conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Venezuela. HEPP6 invites papers and panels on the following and other related themes:

- Affects, a(nta)gonism, and political polarisation
- Audiovisual political communication
- Authoritarianism and illiberalism
- Climate, crises, and grievances
- Cultural populism, conspiracy theories, and misinformation
- Emotional mechanisms of grievance and populist politics
- Gender and intersectional positions in populism and polarisation
- Grievance politics and the politics of victimhood
- Hegemony, common grounds, and epistemic populisms
- LLM and computational methods in large social media data on HEPP themes
- Mediatised populism
- Memory politics and the political (mis)use of time and space
- Political frontiers and "us" building
- Political humour and populist rhetoric
- Political theory of populism
- Populist challenges to democracy
- Populist logics and dynamics
- Post- and de-colonialism
- Religion and populism
- Tribalism, nationalism, and racism
- Vulnerability, stigmatisation and self-representation
- War and violent conflict

We always aim to cultivate a friendly, fun atmosphere at the HEPP conferences. To this end, we seek to gather international researchers at all career stages from a variety of fields to engage in conversation around our critical areas of interest.

Important dates and submission details

HEPP6 will take place on 18-20 May 2026 at the University of Helsinki and online (as with previous conferences, HEPP6 will be fully hybrid).

The deadline for paper and panel submission is 31 October 2025.

Paper submissions should include:

- A paper title
- A 200-word abstract (max 1000 characters)
- Five keywords answering the paper's topic, method, theory, data, country case (if applicable)

We further encourage the submission of panel proposals comprising three to five papers with a panel chair. Please include the abstract of the panel and paper abstracts according to the description above.

Please find the full call here: https://www.helsinki.fi/en/conferences/emotions-populism-and-polarised-politics-media-and-culture/call-papers

REPORT ON THE 2025 E&D CONFERENCE

INAUGURAL CONFERENCE OF THE ECPR STANDING GROUP ON EXTREMISM AND DEMOCRACY

Léonie de Jonge, *University of Tübingen*
Daphne Halikiopoulou, *University of York*
Annika Werner, *University of Southampton*

On 9–10 June 2025, the Standing Group (SG) on Extremism and Democracy (E&D) held its first-ever standalone biannual conference, in collaboration with the Centre for Governance and Democracy (CGD) at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL).

The idea of organising a dedicated conference for our SG had been on our minds for some time. With our vibrant membership now exceeding 780, we face high rejection rates at the ECPR General Conference, where SG panels are typically capped at 10. A standalone event, therefore, offered a welcome, additional opportunity to meet in a more focused setting, allowing junior and senior members to connect and exchange ideas. Additionally, given the increasing urgency and academic interest in the topics of extremism, democracy, and populism, the timing felt right.

We were inspired by the successful examples set by other SGs, such as those on the European Union and Gender and Politics, which have hosted similar events in recent years. The SG's Steering Committee partnered with Javier Sajuria and Stijn van Kessel from QMUL, who generously offered to host the event. A call for papers was issued on the theme "New and Old Challenges of Populism and Radicalism", attracting broad interest. The conference ultimately featured [nine thematic sections](#), showcasing the breadth of current research on pressing democratic challenges, extremism, and populism. Over the course of two days, more than 130 participants presented their work across 37 panels. Topics ranged from gender and the far right, to everyday extremism, the normalisation of radical politics, the role of truth and deception in populist communication, environmental populism, and democratic erosion.

A central highlight was a featured roundtable on the conference's core theme, moderated by Javier Sajuria. The discussion brought together four distinguished speakers: Tim Bale (Queen Mary University of London), Kathleen Blee (University of Pittsburgh), Tereza Capelos (University of Southampton), and Andrej Zaslove (Radboud University Nijmegen). Together, they explored diverse scholarly perspectives on democratic backsliding, the rise of authoritarian governance, and the global mainstreaming of far-right ideologies.

Another major highlight was the keynote lecture by Kai Arzheimer (University of Mainz), titled *"A Quarter-Century of Extremism and Democracy — Now What?"*. Reflecting on the origins of the SG, which was founded in 1999 by Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde, Arzheimer offered a retrospective on the group's origins,

evolution and its contributions to the field. He also presented an analysis of conference submissions, which revealed interesting emerging thematic trends, including a focus on gender and German politics.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all our distinguished speakers, as well as the section chairs who dedicated time and effort to putting together the thematic sections. Overall, the two-day event was a great success, marking the start of what we hope will become a flagship biannual tradition for our Standing Group. We are now looking for a host institution for the 2027 E&D Conference. If you or your university are interested in collaborating with us, please reach out at: ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com

The organising team from left to right: Stijn van Kessel, Javier Sajuria, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Annika Werner and Léonie de Jonge

The conference reception was held at the Octagon, a historic venue built in 1887 that originally served as the Queen Mary library.

EXPERT INTERVIEWS

THE PORTUGUESE SNAP ELECTIONS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CHEGA

Mariana S. Mendes
Mercator Forum on Migration and Democracy, TU Dresden, Germany

1. **In the Portuguese snap elections on 18 May 2025, the far-right party Chega reached an unprecedented high result of 22,8%. How do you explain its sudden electoral success?**

Chega reaps the most benefits from two issue positions that are typical of the populist radical right and that are central to Chega's platform. The **first** is its general anti-establishment stance or, to put in another way, its populist discourse. This has been the bread and butter of Chega's platform since day one, that is, since its emergence in 2019. While Chega ticks all the populist boxes, it is its anti-establishment posture in particular that stands out – essentially encapsulated in the classic claim that the 'parties of the system' and their elites are corrupt and self-serving, working primarily to benefit themselves. This type of discourse was in itself an innovation in Portugal, since there was no party before with such a blunt anti-establishment rhetoric. When seen from this perspective, its success is not so surprising, given the long-standing presence of empirical indicators suggesting there was a latent demand for a party of this type: from widespread populist attitudes among the population to pervasive perceptions of corruption, or simply high levels of political disaffection and distrust in elites.

The **second** element is Chega's nativist or ethnonationalist posture – initially more centered around anti-Roma rhetoric, but recently more focused on immigration. My hunch is that this contributes to explaining Chega's recent growth, as immigration has suddenly become an important issue in Portugal – something that was not the case before 2024. The 2025 election is the only one in which you will find immigration listed as a relevant issue among the public's top priorities. Importantly, this is not only the result of Chega's issue entrepreneurship, but also of two other important factors – the first being the objective fact that immigration numbers have risen considerably in the last few years, and the second that the center-right government has been keen on politicizing the issue.

While these two elements are essential to understanding Chega's success, its rapid growth must also be seen in the context of a succession of electoral opportunities. Portugal held a total of four (!) legislative elections between 2019 and 2025, the last two being provoked by suspicions of misconduct on the part of the respective prime ministers; a context that naturally added fuel to the fire. But while this

context likely favored Chega's growth, I also think that the simple succession of elections – and the party's growth in each of them – contributed to Chega's rapid normalization, 'lowering the barriers' for new voters.

2. What are Chega's key political themes and issues?

Chega's issue-profile is prototypical of the radical right (as I show here). There is little emphasis on socio-economic issues – which have otherwise overwhelmingly dominated Portuguese politics – and an overemphasis on non-economic issues. In this sense, Chega is a typical 'issue entrepreneur', putting the emphasis on issues that were of little importance to political competition before. Aside from the two dimensions already mentioned before – anti-establishment and anti-immigrant rhetoric –, Chega also follows the radical right when placing much emphasis on 'law and order' issues, such as security and crime. What I find most interesting, though, is to explore how Chega compares to other radical right forces in its *relative emphasis* on their typical themes. For example, while I think in its initial stages Chega's anti-immigration profile was relatively low-key, this has changed dramatically over the last one or two years. This also means that its securitarian agenda is more and more linked to immigration. To me, this is evidence that parties like Chega are not only issue entrepreneurs but also 'ride the wave': faced with changing immigration realities and increasing attention to the issue, the party reinforced its issue entrepreneurship strategy, putting a lot more emphasis on the topic than before.

3. What will be Chega's impact on the - previously bipartisan - Portuguese party system and broader role in this new parliamentary term?

Naturally, Chega's growth comes with a number of challenges that are common to many other contexts where radical right forces transformed the party system. **Firstly**, increasing fragmentation means there is an increasing likelihood of minority governments, which tend to be less durable. Although these are not new in Portugal (a country where there is no tradition of 'grand coalitions'), they have not been that common and mostly took place on the left. Now it is the center-right who has to get used to governing with thinner majorities. This requires governing parties to (learn to) negotiate with opposition parties to a greater extent than in the past. **Secondly**, similarly to elsewhere, Chega's growth has contributed to shift political discourse to the right, particularly in the case of the ruling center-right party (PSD), who is now paying unprecedented attention to issues like immigration and security. Importantly, this is not only a matter of discourse but has concrete policy implications. For example, the parties have recently agreed on a reform of Immigration Law that, among other things, makes the rules for family reunification significantly stricter (a provision that still needs the Constitutional Court's approval). **Thirdly**, when looking at the parliamentary arena in particular, Chega's confrontational and provocative style has clearly disrupted established norms of decorum and intensified the dynamics of political

conflict and polarization in parliament. While this was less of an issue in 2019-2022, when Chega had only one representative, the party now has the second largest parliamentary group, with 60 representatives.

4. **In some European countries, mainstream parties refuse to collaborate with the far right (typically referred to as cordon sanitaire or firewall). How have established Portuguese parties reacted to Chega so far?**

It is important to distinguish between different types of collaboration – e.g., executive collaboration is different from legislative collaboration. On the one hand, the center-right has clearly ruled out the possibility of establishing a coalition or a formal government agreement with Chega. Interestingly, this decision is usually not justified on normative or principled grounds – as in Germany –, but rather on the basis that Chega is unreliable, unconstructive, and unprepared for office (to paraphrase the Prime Minister here). This has led to the perception that there is an official *cordon sanitaire* strategy in Portugal. On the other hand, it is important to note that the current government is having no problems in negotiating specific bills with Chega on a case-by-case basis. This has become most obvious recently, with the parties negotiating important reforms on Immigration Law and Citizenship Law. The extent to which the so-called *cordon sanitaire* stands is therefore very much open to interpretation.

5. **As one of the few European countries, Portugal used to have a strong communist party. How do you explain the decrease of the far left in recent years?**

I do not have a definitive answer for this. Some will tell you that the far left (the Communist Party, but also the Left Bloc) committed an original sin in 2015 by formally agreeing to provide parliamentary support to the center-left cabinet of António Costa. In doing so, they have lost their traditional status of 'protest parties' and were supposedly punished for cooperating with the executive. However, this narrative is complicated by the fact that these parties were considerably more punished in the 2022 election – when disagreements between them and the second Costa government provoked snap elections – than in the previous election of 2019, when the public seemed generally satisfied with the 2015-2019 left-wing agreement. Speaking of the Communist Party in particular, it should be noted that the trend of decline in support is not exclusive to recent years and should also be put in the context of its aging electorate – the generation that made it a strong party during the 1974 revolutionary period has quite literally been dying out. The fact that times have changed and that the party has not – maintaining its orthodox ideological line – is probably part of the explanation as well.

6. **In the light of recent developments in your field, what are the questions that researchers of 'Extremism and Democracy' should focus from now on?**

When it comes to far-right parties in particular, I get the impression that current research focuses significantly more on discourse (what they say) than on behavior (what they do). Now that these parties are often in government – or otherwise influencing what is being done at the policy level –, I think there is room to further explore their concrete policy impact and the extent to which they are capable of carrying their proposals forward (or not).

AUR'S ASCENT: THE FAR-RIGHT'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN ROMANIA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Henry Rammelt
National School of Political Studies and Administration, Romania

1. Romania held presidential elections on 4 and 18 May 2025 following the annulment of the scheduled 2024 vote due to Russian meddling. How do you explain the strong result (46.4%) of the far-right AUR candidate George Simion?

George Simion's result in the 2025 Romanian elections reflects the consolidation of far-right populism in the country and the evolution of AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians) as a political force since its parliamentary breakthrough in 2020. However, this outcome must also be seen as symptomatic of a broader decline of traditional parties and the rise of challenger formations not only in Romania, but across Europe. Simion's performance in 2025 built on the momentum generated by Calin Georgescu, a former AUR member and self-styled "anti-establishment candidate," who secured nearly 23% of the vote in the annulled first round of the 2024 Presidential election. Georgescu's success, seemingly achieved without formal campaign spending and largely through TikTok and marginal television outlets, demonstrated the effectiveness of (presumably) low-cost, high-reach digital mobilization. After the Constitutional Court annulled the result, citing procedural violations and alleged foreign interference, Georgescu publicly endorsed Simion as his "younger protégé," helping boost Simion's support from 14% in 2024 to over 40% in the first round of the re-run. Under Simion's leadership, AUR has institutionalized a style of politics rooted in nationalist street mobilizations such as "Basarabia e România" (Besarabia is Romania) and campaigns around so-called family values. The failed 2018 referendum to redefine the constitutional understanding of "family" marked a turning point of conservative and far-right forces in Romania, prompting a blend of right-leaning actors to shift from moral campaigning and street mobilization toward institutional engagement. Since entering Parliament in 2020, AUR has combined identity-based appeals with material grievances, including rising levels of personal debt, housing precarity, and the deterioration of public services. Simion's strong result is thus not simply an effect of campaign dynamics, but it reflects deep socio-economic grievances and the structural failure of post-transition governance. AUR has also benefited from a longer-term discursive shift. Over years, nationalist rhetoric and Orthodox tropes have become increasingly normalized across party lines, opening space for more radical actors to appropriate them with greater intensity.

Importantly, the 2025 run-off featured two figures from outside the traditional party system: Simion and Nicușor Dan, founder and former leader of the reformist USR party (Save Romania Union, which itself was born out of civic initiatives and protest movements), although running as an independent candidate. Though ideologically distinct, both reflect widespread disillusionment with post-1989 elites and the fracturing of Romania's party landscape. Their presence in the final round underlines the decline of the traditional parties and

the growing appeal of movement-based or anti-establishment actors. As explored in a recent volume I co-edited, [Power and Protest in Central and Eastern Europe](), far-right and populist challengers have flourished across the region amid rising inequality, the erosion of public goods, and mass emigration.

2. What are the Romanian far right's key political themes and issues?

AURs slogan "Luptăm pentru familie, patrie, credință și libertate" ("We fight for family, homeland, faith, and freedom") encapsulates the ideological framework of Romania's far right. While AUR is the most prominent representative today, it draws on a longer tradition including the ethno-nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) and extra-parliamentary groups, like Noua Dreaptă (now also a political party), known for protesting LGBTQ+ events and promoting Orthodox nationalism. AUR blends cultural conservatism, Orthodox Christianity, economic populism, and sovereigntism. National identity is framed in spiritual terms, with Romania depicted as a bastion of Eastern Christianity. LGBTQ+ rights are portrayed as foreign impositions threatening national values, providing the discursive base for Euroscepticism. Geopolitical neutrality is another important element of the right-wing discourse, that taps into deep-seated anxieties about conflict, economic collapse, and national decline, often amplified by disinformation and a conspiratorial rhetoric. AUR's and Georgescu's success suggests a broader convergence of cultural conservatism, populism, and anti-system discourse by merging religious mysticism with political fatalism.

As discussed in our 2024 [Political Studies Review special issue](), the appeal of these ideologies is structurally rooted in socio-economic and territorial inequalities. The far right thrives in areas marked by depopulation, weak infrastructure, and declining services, as well as among segments of the diaspora who feel culturally alienated and economically exploited abroad. Economic populism frames poverty and precarity not as policy failures or results of the logic of capital, but as evidence of national betrayal and global conspiracies.

3) What has been and will be AUR's impact on the Romanian party system, democratic institutions, and the country's position within the EU?

AUR's rise has significantly reshaped Romania's party landscape. Emerging from the failed 2018 family referendum, it consolidated a conservative electorate alienated by mainstream parties. Initially dismissed as a protest vote, AUR's entry into Parliament in 2020 marked the mainstreaming of themes once confined to the political margins and opening the floor to other populist-right parties (SOS and POT).

By 2024, the party had absorbed anti-restriction sentiment from the COVID-19 period, amplified conspiracy discourse, and emerged as a vocal challenger to Romania's foreign policy consensus. This reached a new level with the (re-)appearance of Călin Georgescu, whose platform included rejecting NATO alignment and suspending aid to Ukraine. Though not (anymore) formally an AUR candidate, his close ties to party networks and his geopolitical posture highlighted the risks of far-right influence on power structures. The Romanian presidency holds significant sway over foreign policy, security, and intelligence.

AUR's increasing popularity therefore raises concerns about Romania's EU positioning and the resilience of democratic institutions.

4. What is the role of Russia in supporting the Romanian far right and anti-democratic actors more broadly?

While I have not conducted any research on this question, available investigations suggest that Russian-linked actors have actively sought to amplify anti-democratic and far-right narratives in Romania. Digital disinformation campaigns have played a central role. According to different Romanian media outlets, advertising networks like AdNow, along with Facebook communities and informal digital groups, have been used to spread conspiratorial content aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions. These include fake news on vaccines, Soros plots, and attacks on EU and NATO alignment. There is a notable overlap between these narratives and the messaging of Romania's far right. Călin Georgescu has openly promoted geopolitical neutrality and criticized military support for Ukraine; positions that closely align with Russian interests. While no direct financial links have been confirmed in Romania, as of yet, European precedents offer cautionary parallels. Joint investigations by DER SPIEGEL, ZDF, BBC, and La Republica have revealed how Russia supports far-right parties across Europe to weaken EU cohesion. In this context, Romanian developments appear consistent with a broader strategy of fostering anti-system actors to destabilize liberal democracies from within.

5. In light of recent developments in your field, what are the questions that researchers of 'Extremism and Democracy' should focus on from now on?

An urgent research priority is the shrinking space for civil society. In Hungary, Poland, Georgia, as well as in "consolidated" democracies, de-democratization goes hand in hand with legal and financial initiatives that restrict protest, grassroots organizing, and critical civic discourse. This includes regulatory constraints, funding cuts, and narrowed protections for free expression and assembly, together with broader prerogatives for law enforcement and repression. These developments erode key bulwarks of democratic resilience. We must reassess the role of protest and civil society in shaping democratic systems, something we do in the [Horizon Europe project ProTest](#), in which I coordinate the Romanian team. ProTest investigates how protest culture is affected by democratic decline and how, in turn, it influences political inclusion and democratic resilience.

Most importantly, however, the field must come to terms with the political economy of extremism. The rise of the far right is inseparable from the failures of neoliberal governance. Strains on the social fabric of society, such as the closure of factories driven by distant investors, the mass emigration from once-prosperous regions, the exploitation of Romanian labor abroad, and the spectacle of extreme wealth, space tourism, billionaires in submarines, fuel a collective sense that people's lives are shaped by opaque and external forces. Researchers must interrogate the material foundations of discontent rather than treating extremism as a purely cultural or ideological phenomenon. One of the most

important tasks, then, is to critically (re-)examine the role of contemporary capitalism in shaping political life.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ghita Bordieri
University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy

Out of Hiding: Extremist White Supremacy and How It Can Be Stopped was published in early 2024, several months prior to President Trump's second election in the United States. While the book does not mention this electoral outcome, a retrospective reading offers an accurate and compelling analysis of the persistent dynamics that facilitated the far right's mainstreaming. It is particularly valuable at a time when understanding U.S. political developments feels urgent—even for international readers—and increasingly complex.

Sociologists Kathleen Blee, Robert Futrell, and Pete Simi draw on their longstanding expertise in far-right studies to show how extreme white supremacy—once confined to the margins, though always embedded within systemic racism—has gradually moved to the center of the U.S. political landscape, becoming increasingly normalized among broader segments of the American population. The authors draw from a rich archive of observations, interviews, and data accumulated over 30 years of excellent research on the topic to suggest that this rise does not represent a rupture, but a continuation of enduring forms of racial extremism, which activists have gradually brought out of hiding and into the mainstream electoral arena.

The authors propose understanding white supremacy not as a network of organizations but as a *constellation* of practices, ideas, and emotions, a culture that is creatively enacted over time adapting to shifting political conditions— a concept they explored in depth in their 2024 article on Mobilization (Blee, Futrell, and Simi, 2024), which is convincingly applied in this book. Their approach helps to explain the persistence of white supremacy despite the fragmentation and volatility of the organizations that promote it and suggests that tracking individual actors or groups may be less effective than understanding the long-term cultural dynamics at play.

The analysis begins with an overview of the white supremacy period of abeyance in the 1980s and 1990s (Chapter 2), when extremist organizations, pressured by the civil rights movement of the 1970s and increased federal surveillance, splintered into smaller, less visible groups that mostly withdrew from public actions. The authors emphasize that, rather than completely disappearing, they continued to cultivate their practices in private settings and encouraged their members to adopt lone-actor tactics and infiltration strategies to avoid public scrutiny. The analysis proceeds in the upcoming chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), which identify three "critical junctures" where federal agencies and political and

cultural leaders could have obstructed the re-emergence of white supremacist practices but instead failed to recognize and address the threat.

The first key moment (Chapter 3) was the backlash to Barack Obama's 2008 election, which revitalized white supremacist activity both offline and online. Offline, the Tea Party opened electoral politics to white supremacist ideas, emphasizing racial resentment, Christian nationalism, and status anxiety. Violent groups carried out deadly attacks on black churches and Sikh temples. New militias like the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters emerged, escalating threats, especially during the Ferguson Black Lives Matter protests. Federal authorities largely ignored and understated these developments. Online, white supremacist groups recruited new members under the banner of the "alt-right," attracting individuals who might previously have avoided public affiliation with white supremacy through conspiratorial beliefs rooted in racism, misogyny, and antisemitism.

The second juncture moment identified by the authors is the *Unite the Right* rally in Charlottesville (Chapter 4), where protesters from disparate organizations—armed with guns and knives—attacked anti-racist demonstrators. Donald Trump's first MAGA campaign and election had by then galvanized a well-connected online network of white supremacist organizations, now eager to act. Although arrests followed the beatings and the murder of an anti-racist protester, these actions only briefly slowed the movement's public momentum. The weak prosecution of offenders—and even open legitimization by the same Trump — set a precedent for subsequent developments.

The third event is the insurrectionary attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 (Chapter 5), an event that starkly illustrated how deeply white supremacy had penetrated the U.S. political mainstream by the end of Trump's first term. This explosion of violence was far from isolated; it echoed earlier events and marked a definitive coming out of hiding of white supremacism.

The book is clear and readable, making it accessible to a broad audience, while also offering depth for more expert readers, who will value its rich data, long-term analytical perspective, and persuasive theoretical framing. The concept of white supremacy as a *constellation* is especially convincing as it shifts the focus beyond individual actors or organizations and draws attention to recurring patterns—references to Nazis, the KKK, white Christian nationalism, and other white supremacist variants reappear cyclically across different contexts in adapted forms. This perspective reveals a complex network of meanings and practices that is flexible yet anchored in very clear symbolic cores, allowing for continuity even when strategies shift or ideologies are differently articulated.

While the authors divert attention from individual actors, their analysis is not blind to agency. They offer a detailed account of the concrete strategic efforts by various actors to cultivate their political culture within small circles during periods of abeyance, and to disguise its most recognizable traits to make it more palatable to average white Americans. They describe efforts to build bridges and shared interpretations among different organizations in moments when the political context allowed for more overt expressions of extremism. The result is a

meticulous description of the dynamics of circulation, adaptation, and continuity in the practices, ideas, and emotions of white supremacist culture.

In this sense, *Out of Hiding* not only offers a compelling analysis of white supremacy's entrenchment in U.S. politics but also equips readers with conceptual tools to recognize its shifting forms elsewhere—making it essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the cultural and political logics of the contemporary global far right.

References

Blee, Kathleen, Robert Futrell, and Pete Simi. 2024. 'A Constellation Approach to Understanding Extremist White Supremacy'. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 28(4):435–44.

Ghita Bordieri is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Milano-Bicocca. Her work lies at the intersection of cultural and political sociology. Her doctoral dissertation focuses on the role of culture in processes of organizational change, drawing on interviews and ethnographic fieldwork conducted within the radical right party *Lega Salvini Premier*. She is currently working on the topic of food and politics.

MARIO DUNKEL AND MELANIE SCHILLER (Eds.) "POPULAR MUSIC AND THE RISE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE."
LONDON, ROUTLEDGE. 2024. 202 pp. £33.59. ISBN 9781032275239

Luca Carbone
KU Leuven, Belgium & Hannover University of Music, Drama, and Media, Germany

At first glance, populism and popular music may seem like worlds apart. Populism is a political ideology that, at its best, reclaims space for the allegedly disenfranchised, and at its worst, mobilizes stereotypes and thwarts the fundamentals of democracy. In contrast, popular music serves as a widely enjoyed and consumed form of light entertainment. The great merit of the volume *Popular Music and the Rise of Populism in Europe*, edited by Dunkel and Schiller, is to question this apparent distinction by showing how music functions as a central agent in bringing populist ideas to "the people". As more populist parties and movements enter national governments, an increasing body of research has focused on the so-called mainstreaming of populism, namely the normalization of populist ideas from relatively small margins to a larger center. While a considerable body of recent literature has particularly focused on shifting societal norms (Valentim, 2024) and ideological diffusion through social media (Mutascu et al., 2025), we know less about popular practices that resonate with people's everyday experiences. Yet, this is a central aspect of populist rhetoric: reclaiming the dignity of ordinariness and everyday life against greedy and detached elites. To fill this gap, the book focuses on a medium that is widely consumed, evocative of folk imaginaries, and expressive of lighthearted and deeply-felt enjoyment. Popular music not only facilitates physical co-presence; it also constructs symbolic and affective communities by articulating grievances and hopes in melodic narratives, themes, and spaces. It is thus one of the best grounds for bringing "the people" together. The book conceives popular music as a prominent cultural arena in which populist ideas and practices are disseminated, constructing populism as a cultural phenomenon deeply embedded in everyday practices.

The introduction offers a persuasive framework for reading populism as a performative style through the concept of music affordances: music affords its audiences with specific readings and meanings based on its performances and contextual opportunity structures. Drawing on Mouffe, Rosenthal, Berezin, and others, the editors carefully tie together populism's discursive tropes ("the people" vs. "the elites", narratives of crisis) and its cultural mechanisms of mainstreaming through affect and symbols. In doing so, they provide a robust analytical framework that allows each case study in the volume to illustrate how populism is mediated and affectively embodied through musical genres, performances, reception practices, and affective materiality. Building on such a framework that blends discourse theory, cultural sociology, ethnomusicology, and political communication, the following case studies embark on a comparative analysis across five European countries – Hungary, Italy, Austria, Sweden, and Germany.

In the first case study, Barna and Patakfalvi-Czirják analyze the Hungarian case and particularly how Orbán's regime co-opts patriotic and anti-elitist songs to craft a nationalist-populist identity. By means of musicological group analysis, the authors contextualize the meanings of pro- and anti-government popular songs within a context of increasingly constrained financial and infrastructural resource allocation. They demonstrate the role of governmental regulation in normalizing populist sentiment – such as by criticizing consumer culture, a lack of traditional values, and spoiled elites – through the regulated distribution of popular music. Focusing on the Italian case, Caiani and Padoan study how populist parties and mainstream artists cultivate a sense of "Italianness" through language, genre, and performance style. Drawing on musicological analysis, interviews with concertgoers, and social-media analysis of Italian politicians, they show how populist tropes of "spectacular commonness", meritocratic humbleness, territorial pride, and masculine coarseness are used to legitimize populist values while remaining sonically palatable and mainstream. In the Austrian case, Doehring and Ginkel explore how popular music contribute to the creation of "the people" in specific settings, particularly at events of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), concerts, and folk festivals. By means of musicological group analysis, interviews, and ethnographic fieldnotes, the authors show how such events contribute to the creation of "the people" by combining elements of the material and geographic culture (lederhosen, beer tents, Alpine landscapes) with music themes (past glory, anti-globalization, hustle culture). By blending elements of music genres such as schlager, folk, rock, and country, the FPÖ's musical strategy embeds nationalist-conservative narratives into affective spaces. Next, Schiller investigates how Sweden Democrats (SD) deploy "heroic averageness"—populist sentiments of proud ordinariness—in the musical performances of the SD's leading band, Bedårande Barn. By gathering ethnographic, interview, and archival material, Schiller shows how the SD managed to gain increased popularity in a national context previously permeable to populist rhetoric through a discursive-performative approach that draws from cultural and linguistic tropes around ordinariness and averageness. Next, she used musicological analysis to reveal the lyrical tropes and performance rituals of three of the most popular songs of the band, showing how populist affect is coded not through extremist rhetoric, but through emotion-laden depictions of everyday life which make "radical right populism fun to participate in". Finally, Dunkel and Kopanski track the trajectories of Xavier Naidoo and Andreas Gabalier as "pop stars turned populist icons." Through persona analysis, the authors argue that these artists function as mediators of populist sentiments, blending mainstream appeal with subtle, at times conspiratorial or xenophobic discourse. The chapter shows the role of biographical authenticity as a potent tool to normalize radical views, particularly around race and ethnicity, through the curated performances of mainstream and underground musica persona.

While the book's theoretical and methodological approach is a clear strength, it also opens up several important questions that remain underexplored. Most notably, its empirical focus rests almost exclusively on far-right populism. While this is partially justified by the recent electoral success and cultural prominence of far-right parties across Europe, the volume would have benefited from a broader engagement with left-wing, centrist, and non-radical right populisms. A more ideologically diverse selection of cases might have revealed points of overlap, divergence, or resistance, offering a more comprehensive view of the

discursive and affective repertoire through which populism operates across the political spectrum. For example, what are the tensions across populist ideologies and how are they expressed in cultural products? How do audiences contend with such tensions? Moreover, the book's empirical emphasis on rallies, festivals, and concerts—while methodologically well-suited for capturing embodied and affective performances—addresses only a limited dimension of everyday popular music consumption. These events are, by nature, self-selective, typically attracting audiences already sympathetic to the political messages being performed. This raises critical questions about how such musical spaces function not only in affirming but also in potentially expanding populist appeal. To what extent do these performances engage new or undecided audiences? How do they contribute to the broader mainstreaming of populist narratives in everyday life? Finally, while the book occasionally references attendance figures at some events, it falls short of offering a systematic account of the scale and distribution of populist engagement through music. Given the volume's concern with the normalization and cultural diffusion of populist ideas, greater attention to questions of magnitude—such as audience size, media reach, and the prevalence of populist content in popular music charts—could have further strengthened its main argument.

Overall, the book provides a timely and rich contribution to the contemporary study of politics, populism, and music cultures. Building on recent scholarship that theorizes and empirically analyzes the link between populism and popular music (Caiani & Padoan, 2023; Dunkel & Schiller, 2022), it offers a solid theoretical framework and a first comparative analysis of the everyday manifestations of populism in different European music cultures. In so doing, it compellingly shows that music is not merely a "reflection" of society, but an active agent in the performance of politics. While providing a broad selection of countries, the volume narrows its focus on far-right populism and on institutionalized events and rallies. More than critiques, I see these as productive openings. They underscore the complexity of the phenomenon under study and highlight the value of this volume in setting an ambitious agenda for future interdisciplinary research in the study of populism and popular culture.

References

Caiani, M., & Padoan, E. (2023). *Populism and (Pop) Music*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18579-3

Dunkel, M., & Schiller, M. (2022). The people vs. the power bloc? Popular music and populism. *Popular Music, 41*(3), 281–292. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026114302200054X

Mutascu, M., Strango, C., & Turcu, C. (2025). Online social media and populism in Europe. *European Journal of Political Economy, 86*, Article 102619. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102619

Valentim, V. (2024). *The normalization of the radical right: A norms theory of political supply and demand.* Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198926740.001.0001

Luca Carbone is a postdoctoral researcher at the Media Psychology Lab (KU Leuven) and a guest professor at the Department of Journalism and Communication Research (Hanover University of Music, Drama, and Media). Luca's work lies at the intersection of media psychology and cultural sociology to study media uses and effects for youth's identities and well-being in everyday media environments, with a particular focus on music and media entertainment. Their work has been published in journals such as *Communication Research*, *Poetics*, *Information, Communication & Society*, *Cultural Sociology*, and *Mass Communication & Society*, among others.

PUBLICATIONS ALERT

Our publication alert is based on a semi-automated search and can never be complete. Therefore, please tell us about any **recent** publications of interest to Standing Group members so that we may include them in our newsletter.

Albertazzi, D., van Kessel S., Favero A., Hatakka N., Sijstermans J., Zulianello M. 2025. Populist Radical Right Parties in Action: The Survival of the Mass Party. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Amadi, L. 2025. "Redefining eco-terrorism: a third world perspective." *CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM* 18 (3): 667-696. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2025.2532965.

Arzheimer, K. 2025. "Islamophobia in Western Europe is unrelated to religiosity but highly correlated with far right attitudes." *RESEARCH & POLITICS* 12 (3). https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680251351895.

Bailly, J, N Shchinova, RN Gascó, S Ronginsky, and M Reuchamps. 2025. "Is populism really represented as a threat? An analysis of media discourse on populism in Belgium, France and Spain." *ACTA POLITICA*. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-025-00393-7.

Balcells, L, S Martinez, V Valentim, and E VanderWilden. 2025. "Re-Stigmatizing the Radical Right: A One-Way Street?" *JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE*. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2025.10007.

Banerjee, K, and G Cameron. 2025. "Immigration Bureaucrats and the Development of the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement." *CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE-REVUE CANADIENNE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE*. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423925000204.

Beauregard, P, and J Sijstermans. 2025. "The Spiral of Ressentiment: Emotions and Stigma in Populist Radical-Right Party Activism." *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.10016.

Bellè, E. 2025. "When the Local is Illiberal: Local Welfare Chauvinism and the Populist Radical Right." *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.14.

Bellè, E. 2025. "Just a joke? Humour and gender in a far-right party." EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY. 12 (1): 34–56. https://doi.org/10.1162/ecps_a_00003

Bourne, AK. 2025. "Democratic Illiberalism, Anti-Populism and Cultures of Opposition to Populist Parties in Europe." *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.10010.

Bove, V, R Di Leo, G Efthyvoulou, and H Pickard. 2025. "Terrorism, Perpetrators, and Polarization: Evidence from Natural Experiments." *JOURNAL OF POLITICS* 87 (3): 1062-1078. https://doi.org/10.1086/732969.

Brigevich, A, and A Wagner. 2025. "Anti-establishment versus authoritarian populists and support for the strong(wo)man." *FRONTIERS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE* 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1605460.

Bucci, G. 2025. "They came after us: mainstream left's response to the rise of the

populist radical right in Romania and Bulgaria." *EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2025.2538482.

Burchett, C. 2025. "Of the people and the elite? The strategic framing of Jews, antisemitism, and Israel by the AfD and the FPÖ." *PARTY POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688251358140.

Carrión, JF. 2025. "Populism and Democracy: What We Know and Don't Know." *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY*. https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqaf054.

Cetin, FU, and B Demir. 2025. "No Longer the Only Game in Town? Immigration, Authoritarianism and the Future of Democracy in the West." *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.6.

Cârstocea, R. 2025. "Anti-Semitism at the Intersection of Corruption and Colonialism: Continuities of Political Rhetoric in Romania from the Nineteenth Century to the Interwar Period." *EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETIES*. https://doi.org/10.1177/08883254251352116.

Crulli, M. And M Zulianello. 2025. Not really concerned? Populist radical right voters and climate change. *ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS*. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2025.2506344.

Döring, H. 2025. "Climate extreme: radicalisation tendencies in the German climate protest movement." *CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM* 18 (3): 744-770. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2025.2546697.

Enyedi, Z, and B Stanley. 2025. "Farewell to the liberal consensus: the intellectualisation of political projects in Poland and Hungary." *EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE*. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-025-00542-8.

Felicetti, A, and A Terlizzi. 2025. "Far-Right on the Offensive: Public Sphere Responses to the Extremist Attack in Macerata, Italy." *POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW*. https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299251343747.

Gagnon, A, and T. Gelashvili. 2025. "How Can Institutions Better Support Researchers? The Case of Extremism and Terrorism Research." *QUALITATIVE RESEARCH*. https://doi.org/10.1177/14687941251341992.

Gagnon, JP, S Shah, and B Kelly. 2025. "Racism Undermines High-Performance Democracies." *CHINESE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-025-00306-1.

García, JZ, SU de Reguero, and L Zanotti. 2025. "Global or traditional Madrid? Neoliberalism and nationalism in the discourse of VOX and PP on Latin American immigration." *REVISTA ESPANOLA DE CIENCIA POLITICA-RECP* (68): 131-158. https://doi.org/10.21308/recp.68.05.

Goerres, A, J Elis, and SJ Mayer. 2025. "The political life cycle and electoral mobilisation among immigrant-origin and native citizens during the 2021 German election." *WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2025.2524879.

González, I, R Rodríguez, RM Lobato, E Hidalgo-Tenorio, PC Aritzeta, D Sànchez, and M Moyano. 2025. "Risk and protective factors in the radicalization process of the 17-A terrorist cell." *BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL AGGRESSION*. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2025.2523590.

Grosche, C, and T Rothmund. 2025. "Yesterday, all our troubles seemed so far away-(Re)conceptualizing nostalgic deprivation as a predictor for radical-right support." *POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY*.

https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.70057.

Guedes-Neto, JV, and A Honeker. 2025. ""And some, I assume, are good people": Determinants of elites' strategic discourse about immigrants and refugees." *ELECTORAL STUDIES* 96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2025.102952.

Gürsoy, Y, and TS Baykan. 2025. "The frenemy within: populism's dual role in democratization." *DEMOCRATIZATION*. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2536214.

Hobolt, SB, SA Popa, and W van der Brug. 2025. "European democracy in action? The 2024 European Parliament elections." *JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY*. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2542254.

Huijsmans, T, and W van der Brug. 2025. "Place-based resentment and party support in multiparty systems: A study of three consecutive elections in the Netherlands." *ELECTORAL STUDIES* 96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2025.102963.

Just, A. 2025. "Islam, Origin Countries, and Democracy Satisfaction Among Immigrants in Western Europe." *POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY*. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129251352391.

Karavasilis, L. (2025). What we talk about when we talk about 'the elite'in populism studies: re-examining an often-neglected term in the cases of Die Linke and AfD. *CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES*, 1-17.

Kim, D, T Muraoka, C Lucas, JM Montgomery, and M Tavits. 2025. "Polarization but not populism strengthens the association between presidential election results and emotions." *POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND METHODS*. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2025.22.

Lamour, C. 2025. "Normalizing the Radical Right's Discourse on Press Freedom in the European Parliament: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to the EMFA Debates." *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.7.

Marino, A, and SD Filipe. 2025. "Distrusting 'them' and creating 'us': migration and the uses of the past by populist radical right parties in southern Europe." *FRONTIERS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE* 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1504341.

Martinez, C. 2025. "Between Protection and Exclusion: Liminal Status and Latino Youth Civic and Political Participation in the Shadow of Immigration Enforcement." *POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY*. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129251367058.

Nagy, A, and J Dúró. 2025. "THE INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION ON HUNGARIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION." *JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS* 18 (2): 5-23.

Nielsen, RSH, KN Breidahl, and TF Hedegaard. 2025. "The Link Between Individual Predispositions and Misperceptions About Immigrants: Insights From Denmark." *SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES* 48 (3). https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.70010.

Ogunyomi, AI, and OD Esan. 2025. "Terrorism, religious fundamentalism and the challenge of (under)development in Nigeria: an existentialist intervention." *POLITIKON* 52 (1): 39-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2025.2518714.

Omeni, A. 2025. "Before Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and Violence in Northern Nigeria." *TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE*.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2025.2511083.

Ovádek, M. 2025. "Judicial diversity and immigration appeals: evidence from the United Kingdom." *WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2025.2527542.

Park, S, and MJ Shin. 2025. "Public support for immigrants and refugees: do gender differences exist?" *POLITICS GROUPS AND IDENTITIES*. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2025.2543299.

Reibold, K. 2025. "Racism, cultural integration, and the liberal's dilemma." *CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY*. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2025.2528383.

Rekker, R. 2025. "How populist parties fuel science skepticism: Evidence from a 15-year panel study." *ACTA POLITICA*. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-025-00391-9.

Segers, I. B, A. R. Jupskås, and A. Gagnon. 2025. "Institutional Responses to Threats and Harassment of Academics: Evidence from a Survey Among Political Scientists in Norway." *SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES*. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.70017

Schäfer, A, and J Wenker. 2025. "Losers' Dissent: How Election Results Shape Populists' Satisfaction with Democracy." *GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION*. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.10.

Schürmann, L, E Borbáth, and S Hutter. 2025. "Protest and the rise of left-nationalist challengers: evidence from Germany." *SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES*. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2025.2530410.

Surdea-Hernea, V. 2025. "The populist spiral: How populist rhetoric spreads within party systems." *PARTY POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688251362306.

Thesen, G. 2025. "Reporters lurking at the back-door: Political news, mainstream party policy shifts and radical right party success." *PARTY POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688251366835.

Valentim, V, E Dinas, and D Ziblatt. 2025. "How Mainstream Politicians Erode Norms." *BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 55*. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123425100586.

Wang, X, YH Tong, and JR Liu. 2025. "The rise and fall of exclusion: A longitudinal study of US attitudes toward immigration." *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*. https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121251355910.

Weimann, G, AT Pack, and G Rapaport. 2025. "White Jihad: Fused Extremism?" *TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE*. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2025.2507406.

Xu, RK, and RP Wang. 2025. "The radical change in the UK's China policy in the post-Brexit era: from economic opportunism to ideological confrontation." *BRITISH POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-025-00290-9.

Yanchenko, K., Lipiński, A., and Venizelos, G. (2025). We, the … elites? Anti-elitism of governing populist parties in Poland, Greece, and Ukraine. *JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES*, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2025.2505147

Zaslove, A, RA Huber, and MJ Meijers. 2025. "The state of populism: Introducing the 2023 wave of the Populism and political parties expert survey." *PARTY POLITICS*. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688251361813.

Zúquete, JP and D Pimenta. "Portugal's New Kid in Town: the Populism of Chega." Revista Española de Ciencia Politica: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/100132

Zulianello, M. 2025. Populist Radical Right vs Populist Radical Right in Power: Signalling Ideological Commitment or Competence?. SOUTH EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2025.2477092.

Zhirkov, K, and RH Brehm. 2025. "Beliefs and opinions about "illegal" and "undocumented" immigrants: Conceptual replication of a null result." *RESEARCH & POLITICS* 12 (3). https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680251355233.

e-EXTREME MANAGING EDITORS

Audrey Gagnon, *University of Ottawa*
agagnon2@uottawa.ca

Lazaros Karavasilis, *University of Bremen*
lkaravas@uni-bremen.de

Sabine Volk, *University of Tübingen*
sabine.volk@uni-tuebingen.de

E&D STEERING COMMITTEE

Léonie de Jonge, *University of Tübingen*
Daphne Halikiopoulou, *University of York*
Annika Werner, *University of Southampton*

http://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/extremismanddemocracy/
ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com